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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Terriann Jenkins appeals from her conviction for possession of 
methamphetamine, asserting that the district court erred in denying her motion to 
suppress evidence. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
On April 5, 2010, at approximately 3:23 in the morning, Officer Doerr observed a 
vehicle driving slowly down an alleyway. (R., p.17; 1 Tr., Vol. 1, 2 p.19, Ls.11-17.) After 
following the vehicle for a time, he watched it make an abrupt change in its direction, 
and requested dispatch to run a check on the vehicle's license plate. (R., p.17, Tr., Vol. 
I, p.19, Ls.21-22.) The car was registered to Terriann Jenkins in Wendell, Idaho. (Tr., 
Vol. I, p.21, Ls.2-7.) Officer Doerr personally knew Jenkins from contacts during 2003, 
2004, and 2005 and knew she had resided in the area. (R., p.17; Tr., Vol. I, p.21, Ls.8-
16.) Officer Doerr recognized Jenkins as the individual who was driving the vehicle. 
(R., p.17; Tr., Vol. I, p.25, Ls.6-19.) He asked dispatch to run a check on her driver's 
license. (Tr., Vol. I, p.21, Ls.17-23.) Dispatch reported that Jenkins' Idaho license had 
ovnirorl in ')()()Ll /R n 17· Tr \/nl I n ?~ I c, 1 _,1 \ 
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The probable cause affidavit, encompassing pages 16-23 of the Record, was 
included in the State's initial discovery and admitted at the Suppression Hearing as part 
of State's Exhibit 1. (See Tr., Vol. I, p.4, L.24 - p.5, L.21.) 
2 There are multiple volumes of transcripts from the proceedings below. 
Conforming to Appellant's brief, "Tr., Vol. I" in the State's brief refers to the transcript 
from the motion to suppress hearing held on July 20, 2010. Likewise, "Tr., Vol. II" refers 
to the volume of transcripts from the change of plea hearing held on July 20, 2010, and 
the sentencing hearing held on September 28, 2010. 
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Officer Doerr activated his emergency lights and enforced a traffic stop. (R., 
p.17; Tr., Vol. I, p.25, Ls.1-5.) Jenkins was unable to provide a valid driver's license. 
(R., p.17; Tr., Vol. I, p.26, L.10 - p.27, L.5.) As Officer Doerr approached her vehicle 
with his service dog, Jenkins voluntarily exited her vehicle and consented to a search of 
the car. (R., p.17.) She took a plate of food covered in tinfoil and a metal spoon out of 
the car. (R., p.17.) Officer Doerr noticed that the spoon was coated with a white 
crystalline residue and dried cotton swabs. (R., p.17.) Officer Doerr presented the 
spoon to his service dog and the dog alerted. (R., p.17.) The residue was tested and 
came back positive for methamphetamine. (R., p.18.) 
The State charged Jenkins with possession of methamphetamine in violation of 
I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). (R., pp.37-38.) Jenkins filed a motion to suppress, alleging that 
the officer lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop. (R., 
pp.68-71.) After holding a hearing on Jenkins' motion, the district court denied her 
motion to suppress. (R., p.90.) 
Jenkins entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement in which 
the State agreed to recommend a suspended unified sentence of five years with two 
years fixed, with three years of probation, and Jenkins reserved the right to appeal the 
denial of her suppression motion, and to appeal her sentence if it exceeded the State's 
recommendations. (R., pp.92-102; Tr., Vol. II, p.5, L. 17 - p.8, L 14.) The district court 
entered a judgment of conviction and, consistent with the State's recommendations, 
imposed a unified sentence of five years with two years fixed, but suspended the 
sentence and placed Jenkins on probation for three years. (R., pp.126-31.) Jenkins 
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.137-39.) 
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ISSUE 
Jenkins states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Jenkins' motion to suppress 
the State's evidence? 
(Appellant's brief, p.9.) 
The State rephrases the issue as: 
Has Jenkins failed to establish error in the district court's denial of her motion to 
suppress evidence? 
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ARGUMENT 
Jenkins Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Denial Of Her Motion To 
Suppress Evidence 
A. Introduction 
"Mindful of the standards attendant on the district court's review for whether there 
was reasonable, articulable suspicion to support a traffic stop," Jenkins nonetheless 
asserts that the district court erred in denying her suppression motion. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.10-11.) Jenkins' claim fails. She has failed to establish either clear error in the 
district court's findings of fact or error in the application of law to those facts. 
B. Standard Of Review 
'The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the Court] accept[s] the trial court's findings of 
fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but ... freely review[s] the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 729-30, 
117 P.3d 142, 143-44 (Ct. App. 2005). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess 
the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual 
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 
P.2d 993, 997 (1995). 
C. Officer Doerr Had Sufficient Reasonable Suspicion To Enforce A Traffic Stop 
A routine traffic stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's 
occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable 
searches and seizures. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v. 
Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 {Ct. App. 1998). Because a routine 
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traffic stop is normally limited in scope and duration, it is more analogous to an 
investigative detention than a custodial arrest and therefore is analyzed under the 
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54. 
Under Terry, an officer may lawfully stop a suspect for investigative purposes only when 
the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961 
P.2d 641, 643-44 (1998). 
Reasonable suspicion must be more than a mere hunch; it must be based on 
specific articulable facts and the rational inferences that naturally follow from those 
facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896-97, 821 P.2d 949, 
951-52 (1991). To justify the officer's detention of a defendant, the State is not required 
to prove the defendant's guilt on the underlying offense. State v. Kimball, 141 Idaho 
489, 492-93, 111 P.3d 625, 638-39 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499, 
502, 36 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Ct. App. 2001). Rather, the reasonableness of the police 
officer's suspicion is evaluated based upon the totality of the circumstances at the time 
of the seizure. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); State v. 
Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Schumacher, 136 
Idaho 509, 515, 37 P.3d 6, 12 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
The facts are not contested in this case. Officer Doerr followed a car down a 
darkened alleyway at night during his routine patrol. (Tr., Vol. I, p.19, Ls.11-17.) 
Suspicious of criminal activity, he requested that dispatch run a check on the vehicle's 
Idaho license plate. (Tr., Vol. I, p.20, Ls.17-24.) The license plate came back as validly 
registered to Jenkins, and reflected an address in Wendell, Idaho. (Tr., Vol. I, p.21, 
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Ls.2-7.) Officer Doerr personally knew Jenkins from contacts during 2003, 2004, and 
2005 and knew she had resided in the area. (Tr., Vol. I, p.21, Ls.8-16.) Officer Doerr 
recognized Jenkins as the individual who was driving the vehicle. (Tr., Vol. I, p.25, Ls.6-
19.) He asked dispatch to run her Idaho driver's license. (Tr., Vol. I, p.21, Ls.17-23.) It 
came back expired since 2004. (Tr., Vol. I, p.23, Ls.1-4.) 
Idaho Code § 49-301 provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person, except those 
expressly exempted by the provisions of this chapter, shall drive any motor vehicle upon 
a highway unless the person has a current and valid Idaho driver's license." I.C. § 49-
301 (1 ). Based on the totality of the circumstances known to Officer Doerr at the time of 
the traffic stop, he had reasonable, articulable suspicion that Jenkins was driving in 
violation of Idaho's licensing requirements in I.C. § 49-301, and was therefore justified in 
pulling her over. 
In her motion below, Jenkins seemed to argue that the officer lacked sufficient 
cause to justify the traffic stop because she, in fact, possessed a valid Michigan 
chauffeur's license. (See R., pp.69-71.) On appeal, Jenkins has correctly noted that 
the State is not required to prove actual guilt of the underlying offense to justify the 
seizure. (Appellant's brief, p.11; see also Hollon, 136 Idaho at 502, 36 P.3d at 1291.) A 
mistake of fact made by police officers in the field is permissible if it is a mistake that a 
reasonable person might make by acting on the information known to the officer at the 
time of the seizure. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-804 (1971 ); Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). The officer must also subjectively believe the truth of 
the fact he is mistaken about. Kimball, 141 Idaho at 493, 111 P.3d at 639. Because 
Jenkins was driving a vehicle with an Idaho license plate, with a valid Idaho registration, 
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with an Idaho address, and the officer had numerous prior contacts with Jenkins in 
Idaho, Officer Doerr's subjective belief that if Jenkins was licensed she would be 
licensed in Idaho was a reasonable inference that naturally followed from those facts. It 
would be unreasonable, given the facts known to the officer at the time of the traffic 
stop, to expect him to anticipate that Jenkins would be licensed in Michigan. 
For all the above reasons, the district court correctly denied Jenkins' motion to 
suppress evidence and its judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of 
Jenkins' motion to suppress evidence. 
DATED this 12th day of August, 2011. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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